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Works council participation in the European Company:                                             
A case study of a non-headquarter production site in Denmark 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The creation of a European company or a Societas Europaea (SE) has been a possibility 
for companies within the EU since 2004. This paper investigates how non-headquarter 
employee representatives in SE works councils experience their influence on managerial 
decisions. It examines the case of the first SE present in Denmark, MAN Diesel & Turbo, 
which became a SE in 2006 and has its headquarter in Germany. Empirically the paper 
is based on interviews with two shop stewards from the MAN Diesel & Turbo produc-
tion site in Copenhagen and with the local site manager as well as a secondary analysis 
of existing literature on MAN Diesel & Turbo and on SEs. The case study shows that the 
participation in the SE works council has led to increased influence for the Danish em-
ployee representatives not only at European level but also at local level. 
 
Key words  
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Introduction and background 
The creation of a European company or a Societas Europaea (SE) has been a possibility 
for companies within the EU since 2004 (Keller & Werner 2008, 2012). This is an attrac-
tive alternative for managers, as it makes it easier to move headquarters from one 
country to another and it allows managers to skip part of the national bureaucracy in 
member states, where the company is present (Gold & Schwimbersky 2008). It is, 
however, a precondition that managers and employee representative negotiate the 
conditions for information and consultation, i.e. the conditions for a SE works council 
(SE-WC),  and the conditions for a SE company board with the participation of employ-
ee representatives. Both forms of participation is obligatory, if they existed before the 
company was converted into a SE (Knudsen & Müller 2008; Rosenbohm 2013). This 
supplies the employee representatives with a de facto right of veto, which distin-
guishes the regulation of participation in the European Company from the regulation 
of participation in European works councils (EWCs) (Stollt & Kluge 2011). If the repre-
sentatives do not agree with management on the terms and conditions of the SE-WCs 
and SE boards, there will be no European company. Today, a total of 234 SEs with 
more than five employees are registered (Rosenbohm 2013). However, they are not 
evenly distributed among the EU member countries. More than half of the SEs created 
are present in Germany, whereas only few SEs are found in Scandinavia (Rehfeldt et al. 
3 
 
2011). A suggested explanation is that SE regulations allow German managers to re-
duce the number of German employee representatives at company boards compared 
to German legislation (Keller & Werner 2008, 2012). 
Case studies have suggested that the creation of European companies 
can increase employee influence trough transnational works councils in two different 
ways; 1. SE-WCs are created in companies, which previously did not have EWCs, or 2. 
SE-WCs replace EWCs in ways that improve the influence of employee representatives 
(Rosenbohm 2013). However, it is an open question, whether the improvement in the 
latter case both goes for headquarter and non-headquarter representatives. The dif-
ferent regulation of employee participation in the European Company Statute com-
pared to the European Works Council Directive could be an argument for increased 
influence for non-headquarter representatives. The creation of a European Company 
(and a SE-WC) is based on employer initiative – the negotiation on a EWC is based on 
employee initiative (Stollt & Kluge 2011). The fact that employers might have strong 
incentives to create a SE (fewer employee representatives at company boards, easier 
to move headquarters, less bureaucracy) and that employee representatives are given 
a de facto right of veto increases the bargaining power on the side of the employees. 
Furthermore, moving from a EWC to a SE-WC, the composition and the rules of the 
works council are re-negotiated, which give all employee representatives (including 
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non-headquarter representatives) the possibility to make use of this bargaining power 
and change the existing conditions for information and consultation.   
This paper investigates how non-headquarter employee representatives  
in SE-WCs experience their influence on managerial decisions. It examines the case of 
the first SE present in Denmark, MAN Diesel & Turbo, which became a SE in 2006 and 
has its headquarter in Germany (Pedersen 2006). Does it make a difference for em-
ployee representatives at a production site in another country far away from company 
headquarters to participate in a SE-WC? Does it increase their influence on managerial 
decisions  – op perhaps the opposite? Empirically the paper is based on interviews with 
two shop stewards from the production site in Copenhagen, who have participated in 
the SE-WC, and with the local site manager. The paper also draws on written agree-
ments concluded by the company in relation to transforming it into a SE. Furthermore, 
it includes a secondary analysis of the existing literature on MAN Diesel & Turbo, SEs, 
EWCs and employee influence. The paper is structured in the following way. First, it 
introduces the theory used. Second, the methods of the case study is described and 
third, the analysis is presented. The last section summarises the conclusions of the 
study and discusses their implications.  
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Theoretical perspectives on employee influence in transnational works 
councils: headquarter vs. non-headquarter representatives 
Numerous studies have described the gains and challenges of the establishment of a 
EWC, which has been an option since 1994 and therefore has a longer history than the 
SE-WC (Waddington 2003; Knudsen 2004, 2008; Whittall et al. 2009a; Whittall et al. 
2009b). One of the challenges has been to create an interest among employee repre-
sentatives to join and engage in EWC work. This is especially true for employee repre-
sentatives from company headquarters. These representatives already have access to 
top management and often cooperate closely with them. They might prioritise this 
influence more than the potential influence that can be obtained in an EWC (Bicknell 
2007; Knudsen 2008). Conversely, representatives from non-headquarter sites can be 
more motivated to prioritise EWC participation, because this is their only chance to 
gain access to top management. However, headquarter and non-headquarter repre-
sentatives not only differ with regards to their level of interest in EWC work. Often, 
they also differ in bargaining power. If plants in a multinational cooperation are to be 
closed, employee representatives and site managers hope that top management will 
not pick their plant. In this situation, managers and employee representatives at the 
headquarter site are likely to make use of their proximity to top management, which 
gives them an advantage to managers and employee representatives at the other sites 
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(Hancke 2000). In other words, headquarter and non-headquarter representatives in 
transnational  works councils can be fierce competitors, and we can expect power 
struggles and use of relevant competitive advantages – especially on topics of tactical 
or strategic importance (Knudsen 1995). Questions with a more operative character or 
welfare issues must be expected to cause less trouble among the participants, howev-
er, they might also be less relevant in a transnational than in a local setting (Knudsen 
1995). Power struggles between employee representatives in transnational works 
council can result in lower degrees of employee influence for some participants (in-
formation, or perhaps no information), whereas others succeed in attaining higher 
levels of influence in relation to top management (consultation or co-determination). 
Below is presented an overview of different degrees of influence vs. importance of the 
subject discussed with management: 
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Figure 1: Degree of influence vs. importance of subject. Source: Knudsen 1995, p. 12. 
 
It has often been demonstrated how the coordination of bargaining objectives among 
employee/union representatives and their constituencies, i.e. the process of intra-
organisational  bargaining, forms a larger challenge to employee representatives than 
to managers (Walton & McKersie 1965; Walton et al. 1994; Ilsøe 2012).  Employee rep-
resentatives must coordinate bargaining objectives in a flat structure across heteroge-
neous groups of employees, whereas managers often negotiate from the very top of a 
managerial hierarchy . The challenge of intra-organisational bargaining can only be 
expected to be even more serious in transnational works councils like EWCs or SE-WCs 
with representatives from different countries and company sites. This might be a good 
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argument for headquarter representatives to try to control transnational works coun-
cils as control can ease and shorten the coordination process. Studies of EWCs have 
shown that headquarter representatives in some cases make such explicit use of their 
larger bargaining power and dominate the EWC completely - both power-wise and 
thematically (a so-called ethnocentric EWC) (Perlmutter 2004; Bicknell 2007). In others 
cases, headquarter and non-headquarter representatives create a forum with a more 
equal distribution of bargaining power and which focuses on different issues in differ-
ent countries (a polycentric EWC). Sometimes, all employee representatives are able to 
create a truly equal bargaining power among participants and keep a strict European 
focus on possibilities and problems (a eurocentric EWC). Interestingly, the distribution 
of bargaining power seems to correspond with the focus of the EWC work (headquar-
ter preferences, national issues, European perspective), which underline the decisive 
importance of the bargaining power among participants for the internationalisation of 
transnational works councils. 
  
Methods 
The case study is first and foremost based on interviews with two shop stewards, who 
have participated in the SE-WC, and the site manager from the MAN Diesel & Turbo 
production site in Copenhagen, Denmark. The site manager was included in the study 
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to validate the evaluations made by the shop stewards. If the shop stewards would 
report an increase/decrease in influence and he confirmed this picture, it would be a 
strong statement.  We selected the two shop stewards from MAN Diesel & Turbo in 
Copenhagen with the most experience from SE-WC participation for the study. One of 
the shop stewards had recently retired at the time of the interview, but had participat-
ed in the negotiations of the SE-agreement and was a former member of the SE-WC 
(Shop steward 1). The other shop steward  (Shop steward 2) is the current member of 
the SE-WC from the Copenhagen production site. The site manager and  shop steward 
2 were interviewed simultaneously and on site, whereas shop steward 1 was inter-
viewed separately outside the company. All interviews were conducted in September 
2011 and transcribed in full. Interview guides for the shop stewards included questions 
on the current set-up of the SE-WC (composition, procedural rules etc.), their influence 
on top-management, their bargaining power compared to other employee representa-
tives in the SE-WC, their influence on local managerial decisions and the impact of the 
creation of the SE-WC on their overall influence. Citations to be used in the final analy-
sis were translated into English by the author and approved by the informants after-
wards. The strategy of analysis was thematic. First, interviews were read and an open 
coding was performed. Afterwards, interviews were categorised in main themes.  
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 The case study also included a secondary analysis of available literature 
on the subject of European companies and transnational works councils and available 
literature on MAN Diesel & Turbo SE (and the previous MAN Diesel SE). Furthermore, 
all relevant agreements concluded at MAN Diesel & Turbo, Denmark, was studied. This 
desk research was among others used to prepare and qualify the semi-structured in-
terview guides for the interviews. The result of this research is presented in the section 
below, which describes the creation of the SE-WC at MAN Diesel & Turbo. The analysis 
of the interviews follows immediately afterwards.  
 
The creation of the SE-WC at MAN Diesel & Turbo                                                              
The MAN Diesel SE was created in 2006 as the first European Company in the EU 
(Knudsen & Müller 2008). Before the conversion employees were represented in a 
EWC at MAN Diesel named the Euroforum, which had existed since the mid 1990s. 
Although MAN Diesel at the time had production facilities in France, England and The 
Czech Republic, only employee representatives from the two countries with the largest 
production facilities, Germany and Denmark, participated in the Euroforum (4 German 
representatives and 3 Danish representatives) (Knudsen & Müller 2008). The current 
works council, MAN Diesel & Turbo SE-WC, is a result of a merger between MAN Diesel 
SE and the company MAN Turbo in 2010. There is 14 seats in the SE-WC in MAN Diesel 
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& Turbo SE, which is distributed in the following way: 9 German representatives, 2 
Danish representatives, 1 French representative, 1 Czech representative, 1 representa-
tive from small sites. Furthermore, there are two permanent guests: one from Zürich 
and one from Berlin. In 2009 the MAN Group as such was converted into a European 
Company, MAN SE, and a separate MAN Group SE-WC and was negotiated (Rehfeldt 
2011). 
Detailed studies of the negotiation process behind the establishment of 
the works council (and board) at MAN Diesel SE in 2006 and of the negotiation process 
behind the establishment of the works council (and board) at MAN SE in 2009 have 
been conducted (Knudsen & Müller 2008; Rehfeldt 2011; Rehfeldt et al. 2011). The 
focus of this study is somewhat different, as it investigates the employee influence 
experienced by local managers and shop stewards in the daily work of the SE-WC in 
MAN Diesel & Turbo SE in the years after the creation of the works council. More spe-
cifically, the idea is to investigate the effect of the conversion of a EWC into a SE-WC 
on the influence experienced by employee representatives from a non-headquarter 
production site. 
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 Evaluation of employee influence in the SE-WC 
The analysis of the interviews with the site manager and the shop stewards from the 
MAN Diesel & Turbo production facility in Copenhagen is structured in four themes. 
Each theme focuses on different aspects of the influence experienced by the shop 
stewards by participating in the SE-WC. In sum, both shop stewards and the site man-
ager report about an increase in influence for the Danish shop stewards compared to 
the former EWC. This is not only the case at European level (the SE-WC), but also at 
local level (the local works council).  
 
Employee representation at European level: direct communication and influence in 
relation to top management 
Shop steward 2, who is the current Danish representative in the MAN Diesel & Turbo 
SE-WC, explains how his participation at the works council gives him an easy access to 
important information from top management and to respond to (and sometimes to 
correct) the information they have: 
 
If there is a problem, the SE-WC can invite management to give a report. This gives me, 
a shop steward on the shop floor, the opportunity to talk directly with managers at the 
very top of the company and ask them questions. This is good and gives us a good 
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communication. It removes some of the filter in the system, which will always exist in 
an organization. The higher you want to get, the more filters you have to cross, and the 
story gets better every time. That is why I appreciate direct communication.  (Shop 
steward 2) 
 
The shop steward emphasizes that this direct communication with top management is 
especially important when it concerns considerations about the number of production 
plants, where the competition between the different sites are at its maximum:  
 
It is crucial to be represented and to receive the information directly, because it gives 
you the opportunity to respond immediately. (…) I want to participate in discussions 
that concerns the future of our plant. If top management has received wrong infor-
mation, because somebody wants to look better than they really are, it is nice for me to 
be able to say: ‘’Look, the correct figures are like this’’ (…) It is important to be able to 
do this immediately, because when the decision has been made, you cannot do any-
thing. The structure is too big for that. You have to make sure that your opinion is 
heard in time, when decisions still can be postponed. Then you will be able to have 
some influence on the decision. If you are part of the SE-WC you will be able to do that. 
(Shop steward 2) 
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Here, the current representative from the Copenhagen production site explains the 
difference it makes for him to participate in the SE-WC. Instead of receiving infor-
mation from top management after decisions have been made, he is able to receive 
information before and during the decision making process and take part in consulta-
tion. The important thing is to receive information and participate in consultations on 
strategic issues at the same time as employee representatives from other productions 
sites. This leaves the representatives in the SE-WC with a somewhat similar bargaining 
power towards management. The question is, however, whether this was also the case 
in the former EWC.  
 
From EWC to SE-WC: equal information and broader representation 
The other shop steward (Shop steward 1) that negotiated the conditions for the SE-WC 
explains that the influence they have access to today is not the same as in the former 
EWC (the Euroforum). In his opinion, the degree of influence in the SE-WC is much 
higher, because the SE regulations made it possible for him to negotiate a written rule 
on the information all representatives should receive before meetings. This has made 
it easier for non-headquarter representatives to prepare for the meetings and has con-
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tributed to a more equal orientation of non-headquarter and headquarter representa-
tives:  
 
The company wanted the SE agreement to follow the minimum requirements on infor-
mation and consultation in the EU directive, but we said: ‘’You can forget about that’’. 
The thing is, if the employees say no to the agreement, there will be no SE, and things 
will stay like they are. I did not want to stick with what we already had, but I said: ‘’If 
that is what it takes to make the company agree on better conditions, then it is OK with 
me’’. (…) It was a handicap for me in the Euroforum that only the German representa-
tives had access to the papers. I did not receive them because of the secrecy policies. 
That is why the SE-WC made a difference. It is written very clearly in the SE agreement 
what we are entitled to receive ahead of meetings, and this was not the case in the old 
agreement. In those days we had to fight to get the papers. Therefore I demanded that 
rules on orientation before meetings were included in the SE agreement. In the Eu-
roforum we received the orientation at the meeting, but in the SE-WC we received the 
orientation ahead of meetings. This meant that I received the same level of information 
in the SE-WC as I did in the works council at our site in Denmark. The consequence was 
that we no longer had to watch our papers at the meetings in the SE-WC and we devel-
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oped a more open discussion. We had the same papers in our hands and nobody had to 
watch what they said. (Shop steward 1) 
 
Shop steward 1 describes how he used the de facto right of veto in the SE regulations 
as an instrument to change the rules on information of participants before meetings, 
which meant that non-headquarter representatives received the same information as 
headquarter representatives in the SE-WC (compared to no or limited information in 
the EWC). This facilitated a change in the way the participants cooperated in the works 
council. However, the shop steward also used another strategy to increase information 
levels: to include more countries and production sites in the works council. Only Ger-
man and Danish representatives participated in the EWC (the Euroforum).  However, 
the Danish shop steward used his vice chair position in the Euroforum to argue for a 
broader composition of the bargaining team on the employee side, when the SE 
agreement was to be concluded. The result of this was a broader representation in the 
bargaining team as well as the new SE-WC: 
 
I was the vice chairman in the Euroforum, when the SE agreement for MAN Diesel was 
concluded, and therefore they had to listen to me. I succeeded to include the French 
and the Czech representatives in the negotiations and in the final SE-WC, and this 
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changed the perspective completely. We also included the Polish representatives, and 
suddenly there were almost no limits to the information we could receive. I was sur-
prised about the dramatic change in the level of information. It was a big change com-
pared to the Euroforum, which the German representatives more or less had negotiat-
ed on their own.  (Shop steward 1) 
It is interesting that the broader composition of the works council contributes to an 
increase in influence for all non-headquarter representatives and that the Danish rep-
resentatives prefer this compared to the composition in the former EWC. Previously, 
the Danish representatives were the only non-headquarter representatives and had 
three seats, whereas the German has four. Now they only have two seats out of 14 
seats in the SE-WC. They are a smaller minority than before, but report more influ-
ence. The fight by shop steward 1 for a broader representation might therefore not 
only be a fight to give other non-headquarter representatives a voice, but also a fight 
to increase the degree of his own influence. Here, the number of seats for the individ-
ual non-headquarter site does not seem to be decisive for the distribution of bargain-
ing power between headquarter and non-head quarter representatives (the scenario 
with one large minority). The case study suggests that a broad composition of the 
works council with non-headquarter representatives from many different countries 
and production sites is more efficient to balance out differences in bargaining power 
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(the scenario with several small minorities). One of the reasons to this could be that 
the process of intra-organizational bargaining becomes more complicated, and this 
makes it more difficult for headquarter representatives to dominate the works council 
(even if they still hold the chair position and the majority of seats). 
  
Remaining differences in bargaining power: coordination before meetings and choice 
of language 
Although the Danish shop stewards report an increase in influence for the non-
headquarter representatives in the SE-WC compared to the former EWC, they still ex-
perience some power struggles between the representatives from company headquar-
ters and the other representatives. In spite of a broader representation and rules on 
equal information before meetings, the headquarter representatives still have some 
advantages that goes beyond the fact that they hold the majority of seats and the chair 
position. One of them is that they are able to coordinate their viewpoints in the local 
works council at company headquarters before the SE-WC meetings. In other words, 
they can finalise their own intra-organisational bargaining before the transnational 
intra-organisational bargaining takes place in the SE-WC. According to the current Dan-
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ish representative, it gives the German representatives an advantage to have reached 
agreement before the SE-WC meeting:  
 
The German representatives still think that their own works council is the highest au-
thority in the overall company, although in reality it is not. (…) In many cases they have 
discussed the issues before we meet in the SE-WC, especially if the issues are im-
portant. They talk with each other across the table during the SE-WC meetings, and we 
can hear they have discussed the issues before. (Shop steward 2) 
 
The former Danish representative in the SE-WC confirms this picture, but he also un-
derlines that the SE-WC gives Danish representatives an opportunity to react and pro-
test, if the German representatives run solo on issues that are important for the Dan-
ish production sites: 
 
It has improved. More and more issues are discussed jointly in the SE-WC. Even though 
the chairman  is German, the German representatives now understand the conse-
quences of not including the other representatives in the discussion. The chairman can 
discuss issues with the German representatives, but he cannot discuss issues that af-
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fects the Danish production sites without including us in the discussion. We would im-
mediately find out. (Shop steward 1) 
 
One of the aspects that have been important in the power struggle between the head-
quarter representatives and the other representatives is language. The German repre-
sentatives have insisted on that the language at all meetings should be German. This 
gives them an advantage, as it is their mother tongue. However, the Danish shop 
steward that negotiated the conditions for the SE-WC was able to speak and under-
stand German, and therefore the German representatives were not able to use Ger-
man for confidential conversations: 
 
It was a problem for the German representatives that I spoke German, and they could 
not say anything without me hearing what they said. They could not discuss matters 
privately in the corners, because I would hear it. I was obliged to have a personal inter-
preter, and I also got a very skilled interpreter. I used her at official meetings, because 
otherwise I would not be able to follow what happened. (…) I recommended my succes-
sor to insist on having a personal interpreter at all meetings instead of joining a Ger-
man language class. You will never learn enough German to understand everything at 
the meetings. (Shop steward 1) 
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The Danish shop stewards describe how they have received more information in the 
SE-WC than the EWC. This has increased their influence on managerial decisions, for 
instance via consultation with top management. The higher degree of influence might 
be a consequence of the new rules on information of all representatives before meet-
ings and a broader composition of the works council. However, the shop stewards do 
not think that they have reached a situation of completely equal bargaining power 
among headquarter and non-headquarter representatives. Part of the explanation is 
that the headquarter representives de facto hold the majority of seats and the chair-
man position in the SE-WC. However, better possibilities of coordination among head-
quarter representatives before meetings and the fact that the headquarter represent-
atives have chosen their mother tongue as the meeting language also contributes to 
this difference.  
Whereas the work in the former EWC at MAN Diesel might be character-
ised as mainly ethnocentric, the work in the SE-WC seems to be moving away from 
this. The question is, however, how far the development goes. The shop stewards on 
one hand talk about a more open discussion in the SE-WC, but on the other hand they 
mainly underline the importance of their increased access to defend the interest of 
their own production site in Copenhagen. The overall picture is therefore a develop-
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ment in the direction of a polycentric works council, whereas we find less indications of 
a development in the direction of a eurocentric works council. 
 
Access to top management and influence on strategic issues:  increased bargaining 
power in relation to local management 
Both shop stewards underline that their participation in the SE-WC has not only in-
creased their influence at the European level - it has also increased their influence at 
local level. It is especially the information on - and discussion of strategic issues in the 
SE-WC and the shop stewards consultation with top management on strategic issues 
that affects their relation with the local management in Copenhagen. The shop stew-
ards’ access to information about top management’s strategic considerations and abil-
ity to ask questions supplies them with a stronger bargaining position, when cooperat-
ing with managers in the local works council:  
 
My participation in the SE-WC meant that my discussions with management in the lo-
cal works council in Copenhagen changed. Suddenly they knew that I knew a lot. I al-
ready knew a lot about the things going on in Copenhagen, but then I got the German 
part, too. And what did that mean? Which investments were they planning, and were 
they going to outsource or not? They knew that I knew, but they were uncertain about 
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how much I knew about it, and therefore the local management had to increase their 
level of information to me. (Shop steward 1) 
 
The local site manager confirms that the shop stewards have increased their influence 
on strategic issues at headquarters through the SE-WC. In fact, he thinks that they 
might have a larger influence on such issues than he has, as they get to meet top man-
agement directly on a regular basis:    
 
In some areas my influence is largest, but in other areas the shop stewards have a larg-
er influence than me due to the SE-WC. It depends on the issue. I have a very large in-
fluence on our local managerial decisions, but I have less influence than the shop stew-
ards when it comes to decisions about where the production facilities should be situat-
ed in Europe. (Site manager)   
 
The increased degree of influence in relation to top management for the shop stew-
ards that participate in the SE-WC leads to an increase in influence in relation to man-
agement at local level. This is also confirmed by the current shop steward, who ex-
plains how he meets with the site manager before and after meetings in the SE-WC. 
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They consider the SE-WC as a mutual canal of influence for the production site in Co-
penhagen:  
 
In the old days, employee representatives were only dealing with their own problems in 
each country, and this made it easier for local management in certain countries to ig-
nore those problems. Now it is possible to report such cases to the SE-WC. This is a 
good opportunity for the employees. However, it is also a good opportunity for the lo-
cal management. We talk before the meetings, and he lets me know if there are any 
questions he wants me to address - questions that he cannot get a reply on at his meet-
ings with other managers, but top management is obliged to answer, if I ask them. 
(Shop steward 2) 
 
The citation suggests that participation in SE-WCs can increase the influence of em-
ployee representatives in relation to local management both in cases, where local co-
operation is less developed and in cases, where it is very close. However, it is ques-
tionable whether the mutual strategy towards the SE-WC developed by the local man-
ager and shop stewards at the Copenhagen site will be found at the other non-
headquarter sites. The current shop steward explains how he and the manager have 
developed a strong trust-based informal cooperation, which he does not observe 
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among his German colleagues. To his experience, the German rules on representative 
work makes it more difficult to create a similar space for informal trust-based discus-
sions:    
  
In Germany, managers and employee representatives are more careful about what 
they say. (…) There always sits a HR manager next to management, when they answer 
questions from the works councils. There is always an extra pair of ears and then it gets 
serious, because witnesses are present. This is not the structure in our Danish produc-
tion facility. I can talk to my production manager anytime and discuss a lot of prob-
lems. We can shout and yell at one another, or we can talk quietly, but the only result 
of that is, that we become aware of problems that we have to look into and deal with. 
(Shop steward 2) 
 
It is a bit surprising that both local managers and shop stewards highlight the influence 
on strategic decisions at company headquarters through the SE-WC. One would expect 
that employee representatives would gain such influence to a larger extent by partici-
pation on the SE board, which predominately focus on strategic issues (Van het Kaar 
2011). However, the shop steward that negotiated the SE agreement argue that he 
prefers participation in the SE-WC to participation on the SE board. To his experience, 
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it is easier to gain influence in relation to management, when shareholders are not 
present. He refused to join the SE board because he preferred to gain influence 
through the SE-WC, where discussions with management focus on stakeholder inter-
ests (Rose 2005):  
 
I chose not to join the SE board. They suggested that I should join because of my expe-
rience, but I refused. I think you get more information and more influence at the level 
of the works council, which we call SU in Denmark and Betriebsrat in Germany. You sit 
directly with the managers and explain to them, what is going to happen. When you 
join the company board, you sit next to some shareholder interests, and they do not 
necessarily think the same as managers and employee representatives. They do not 
care about what you say. You can protest and say that you will not sign the accounts , 
but you need to have strong arguments for that . This is the only time you can have 
some influence. (Shop steward 1) 
 
The argument made by the shop steward points at some of limitations by focusing on 
the degree of influence and importance of the subject in relation to employee influence 
and leaving out the context and the temporality of decision making. Perhaps employee 
representatives in general have access to more strategic discussions on the SE board, 
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but the shop steward prioritises the ability to consult management on a limited num-
ber of strategic issues based in the SE-WC. In his eyes, employee representatives and 
management are stakeholders that share interests and language, which means that he 
is able to make an influence on the decision making process. In the case of company 
boards, he thinks employee representatives have little influence on the decision mak-
ing process and only have access to veto the final decision in the end. Although this 
veto right theoretically must be classified as a very high degree of influence , he pre-
fers the influence on the process prior to the decision, where the decision is designed 
and modelled. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
The analysis of the interviews with the two shop stewards from the MAN Diesel & Tur-
bo production site in Copenhagen and the local manager shows that the employee 
representatives experience a higher degree of influence on managerial decisions at 
company headquarters by participating in the SE-WC at MAN Diesel & Turbo compared 
to the previous EWC at MAN Diesel  (the Euroforum). This is confirmed by the local site 
manager. Little or no information ahead of meetings to non-head quarter representa-
tives has been replaced by equal information to headquarter and non-headquarter 
representatives ahead of meetings. This is used as a fundament for a more qualified 
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consultation with top management when needed. In combination with a broader com-
position of the works council, which might have made intra-organizational bargaining 
processes more difficult to control for the headquarter representatives, this has creat-
ed a more open discussion and a more balanced distribution of bargaining power in 
the works council. The right of veto in the SE regulations was used explicitly by one of 
the Danish employee representatives to change the rules of information and the com-
position of the works council. In other words, the case study indicates that the conver-
sion of a EWC to a SE-WCs (and the participation in a SE-WC) can be an attractive al-
ternative for employee representatives at company sites in countries without head-
quarter presence. The re-negotiation of the works council has in the case of MAN Die-
sel & Turbo allowed the non-headquarter representives from Copenhagen to increase 
their influence on strategic issues that are of decisive importance for the Copenhagen 
production site. In sum, there are signs that the cooperation in the transnational works 
council at MAN Diesel & Turbo has moved away from an ethnocentric approach and 
towards a polycentric approach. However, there is still some difference in bargaining 
power between headquarter and non-headquarter representatives, which is caused by 
other things than the number of seats and the distribution of chair positions (the abil-
ity to coordinate before meetings, the choice of meeting language). This means that it 
has not yet been possible to develop in the direction of a eurocentric works council. 
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The study also indicates that local management at non-headquarter pro-
duction sites can gain from the employee representatives’ improved access to the top 
management via the SE-WC. In fact, shop stewards might receive more information on 
strategic decisions through the SE-WC than local management does from other man-
agers. This supplies the shop stewards with a stronger bargaining position in their rela-
tion with local management. However, the trust-based informal relationship between 
the local site manager and the shop stewards a the Copenhagen site might be an im-
portant precondition to this side effect, and it is therefore questionable if it would be 
found at other non-headquarter sites, where local cooperation is predominately for-
mal and characterised by lower levels of trust.   
It is an open question, whether the headquarter representatives in the 
SE-WC experience the same increase in influence as the non-headquarter representa-
tives from Denmark. They are already close to top management  and cooperate with 
them through the local works council (Betriebsrat). Furthermore, we do not know 
whether the broader composition of the SE-WC has led to a decrease in their influence 
in this forum, as the headquarter representatives have not been included in the case 
study. Another option is that all representatives to varying degrees have experienced 
increased influence in the SE-WC. This works council is the second (or third) generation 
of transnational works councils in the company, and other studies of formal represen-
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tation at company level show that re-negotiations of local cooperation structures tend 
to improve those structures and the quality of the cooperation between the partici-
pants (Navrbjerg 2005). Everybody have learned from prior negotiations and the im-
plementation in practice and can use these experiences to refine the next agreement.  
Finally, it is interesting that one of the Danish shop stewards interviewed 
prefers participation in the SE-WC to the participation in the SE board. Danish studies 
of employee participation at company boards demonstrate how employee representa-
tives gain access to more discussions on tactical and strategic issues at board level than 
through works councils (Christensen & Westenholz 2001; Rose 2005). However, one of 
the shop stewards reports that he has gained more influence on such issues in local 
works councils than in local company boards in Denmark. He thinks that this might be 
even more so at the European level. The other shop steward also underlines the im-
portance of being able to affect the early stages of decision making processes in the 
SE-WC and prefers this influence to influence on the final decision. One possible expla-
nation to their statements could be that the importance of the subject and the degree 
of influence are not the only important parameters when it comes to employee influ-
ence. The types of interest represented in the discussion (stakeholder vs. shareholder 
interest) is an important context for the quality of the employee influence that can be 
obtained. Even though the access to tactical and strategic discussions is expected to be 
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more limited in the SE-WC than in the SE board, the possible influence on such issues 
in SE-WCs might be more relevant because it arrives at management in a setting and at 
a time, where decisions can still be adjusted. It can be more attractive for employee 
representatives to gain some influence on the process (the substance and the design 
of the decision) than ultimate veto rights on the final decision. Further studies that 
include employee experiences from the SE boards are needed to investigate if this hy-
pothesis is true.  
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